China’s local debt comes home
In Zunyi, a city in southwestern China, the banks agreed to wait a decade for the first yuan of principal. At the end of 2022, the city-owned Zunyi Road and Bridge Construction Group reached an agreement with its lenders on 15.6 billion yuan in loans. It would pay interest for ten years and repay the principal over the following ten. On that schedule, the banks will still be collecting on loans from China’s building boom in the early 2040s.
Nearly four years later, the land market that once sustained local borrowing is still shrinking. Across China, local governments raised 1.85 trillion yuan from granting rights to use state-owned land in the first ten months of 2026, down 25.8 percent from a year earlier. For a household with a mortgage, the same property slump can mean a home worth less than its owners paid for it. For the city where they live, it means fewer developers willing to bid for the next plot. Both still owe money borrowed in better years.
Land acquired this outsized role partly because of a tax reform in 1994. Beijing took a larger share of revenue while provinces, cities and counties remained responsible for much of the cost of schools, health care and infrastructure. Central transfers covered part of the gap. A fast-growing city had another option. It could grant a developer long-term rights to a site and collect much of the value of those rights up front.
Local officials could also set up a company to borrow from banks or sell bonds. These companies, known as local government financing vehicles, helped pay for roads, bridges and industrial parks. A new road could attract factories and make the surrounding plots more valuable. The city could then collect more at its next land auction. Lenders had reason to expect municipal backing even when the company alone had signed the loan agreement.
The weak point was the distance between what a project was worth to a city and what it earned for its owner. A free road could cut the cost of getting goods to market without generating a yuan in tolls. As long as developers bid more for nearby land, the city had a way to cover the difference. Once the housing market turned in 2021, some borrowers needed another loan to service the last one. That dependence on fresh money is what invites the comparison with a pyramid scheme. It also explains how a city can own valuable infrastructure and still struggle to pay a bill.
Beijing’s response has changed who signs for the debt:
In November 2024, lawmakers approved an extra six trillion yuan in local borrowing authority over three years to refinance eligible hidden debt. A further 800 billion yuan a year was earmarked from existing special bond quotas for five years, bringing the package to ten trillion yuan. By November 11, 2026, local governments had issued about 99 percent of the six-trillion-yuan tranche, shifting obligations once carried off the books onto public balance sheets. A province can borrow more cheaply and for longer than a troubled municipal company. The interest saving is real. The principal still falls due.
Beijing has also tightened scrutiny of new projects in heavily indebted regions. That curbs the ability of one city to borrow for an industrial park simply because its neighbor is building one. It leaves local officials with less discretion over worthwhile projects as well. In October 2026, Beijing allocated 300 billion yuan of unused borrowing capacity to help counties and urban districts meet day-to-day expenses. Keeping existing services running now competes for borrowing capacity once associated with building new ones.
Families can feel the squeeze even while the city pays its bondholders on time:
Local financing companies have fallen behind on bills to suppliers. A contractor waiting for a municipal client to settle an invoice still has to find the cash for wages and materials. In effect, the business is lending the city money every week the bill goes unpaid.
For homeowners, the loss can be more lasting. A fall in an apartment’s resale value reduces the equity available to owners who need to move, while the bank still has a claim on the outstanding mortgage. Cheaper homes help prospective buyers, but a worker whose next paycheck depends on construction has a reason to postpone buying. Investment in residential buildings fell 21.4 percent in the first ten months of 2026. Families also have medical bills and retirement to plan for. As the cushion provided by housing equity shrinks, keeping more cash in the bank makes sense. Beijing is counting on those same households to spend more.
In Shangqiu, in Henan province, residents have already seen how narrowly a public service can survive a cash shortage. In February 2023, the city’s bus operator announced that it would suspend services, citing pandemic losses and a subsidy shortfall. It said it could no longer pay staff or charge its electric buses. The city intervened within hours and the buses kept running. The banks in Zunyi could wait a decade for a principal payment. Shangqiu’s passengers needed a bus the next morning.
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